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Introduction
It has become commonplace in the literature on the workplace of the late twentieth century to describe the profound changes occurring as a third revolution and modern society as post-industrial (Bell 1989 , Mills 1991 . Four recent interrelated changes in the organi zation of work that seem to mark this third industrial revolution are: (1) a flattening of the hierarchy; (2) the disaggregation of functions or outsourcing; (3) an in creased use of flexible, dynamic networks or partner ships; and (4) decentralization of the location of work (Huey 1994, Malone and Rockart 1991, Miles and Snow industrialization, both of which were common well be fore the rise of the information-based economy, elec tronics, computers, and telecommunications. This sim ilarity calls into question the claim that advances in IT are primarily responsible for this form of organization.
A comparison between the proto-industrial, industrial, and post-industrial social and economic systems can question existing causal explanations underlying the or ganization of work in Europe and North America throughout the past 500 years. This historical analysis allows us to incorporate long-term longitudinal data not usually considered in studies of modern IT and organ izational structure, thus building on extant research on industrialization and providing a more complete pic ture of the causal relationship between the two con structs. Adopting a historical perspective also encour ages looking beyond the current ideological preferences that characterize the identification of organizational problems and their appropriate solutions (Kieser 1994) .
Few researchers in the field of information systems have investigated, at the macro level of analysis, the re lationship between the increased use of electronics, computers, and telecommunications and the changes in the way work is organized. Though the structural changes made by several individual companies have been attributed to changes in technology (see, for ex ample, Magnet 1992, Malone and , few carefully controlled, rigorous, scientific studies have been presented to support these espoused causal rela tions, to rule out alternative explanations, and to illu minate contributing and inhibiting factors (though see Brynjolfsson et al., 1994 , for one notable exception).
Without such studies, it is difficult to determine the role of technology, even though managers and informants may state that they believe there is a relationship be tween IT and the changing organization of work. The perceived relationship may be just a widely held soci etal myth rather than reflecting the true relationship be tween IT and structure. Similar gaps between widely held IT myths and objective measures of the results of IT use have been found in previous research. For ex ample, Kling and Iacono (1984) found little objective evidence of IT efficiency and effectiveness claims made by organizational informants and concluded that these claims could be considered ideologically influenced myths.
It is even more tenuous to claim that these same organizational-level causes are acting similarly at higher levels of analysis (e.g. the industry or economy level) causing IT to restructure the post-industrial econ omy. The relationship between IT and the organization of work is a topic that is important to IS researchers, but does not lend itself to the research methods with which most are familiar. It is a topic that would not usually be investigated by economic historians (because it is a con temporary phenomenon), but can best be researched using methods with which they are familiar. This paper represents a collaborative effort to address the ques tions: What are the causes of the changing organization of work? Is the shift to a flattened hierarchy, a disag gregation of functions, a decentralized work location, and the use of flexible dynamic networks or partner ships due primarily to the shift to a knowledge-based economy and the increased use of electronics, comput ers, and telecommunications?
The change to industrialization had a profound im pact on organizations and their workers and the change to post-industrialization will likely have equally pro found implications. This paper investigates this change and considers some possible causes for it using histor ical analysis. In order to determine the causes of the post-industrial organization of work, we compare it to the industrial organization of work, and the proto industrial system of artisanal and "putting out" man ufacturing. We identify strong similarities between post-industrialization, which has been attributed to the use of information technology and an information based economy; proto-industrialization, which was a goods-based manufacturing economy with little infor mation technology; and certain forms of workplace or ganization during industrialization. These similarities cast doubt on the argument that the organization of work is solely and causally linked to the technology. We also review the literature on the role of technology in the organization of work in all three eras to outline the support (or lack thereof) for technological deter minism in each of them. Alternative causes of organi zational structures will be suggested and implications for future research questions and methods will be dis cussed.
held by laypeople (nonhistorians) and its view of pre industrial society and of the rise of the current central ized industrial organizational form, its history, and the forces that led to its widespread adoption. We then present a critique of this view based on the historical literature and review the evidence regarding the causes of industrialization. Next, we describe the widely held view of the changes associated with the post-industrial organizational form with an emphasis on the role of information technology. Fourth, we present a critique of this view by drawing comparisons between the in dustrial and post-industrial organization of work in or der to illuminate the role of technology in the organi zation of work and the relevance of other causal agents.
Finally, we will discuss the implications of this analysis for future research.
Technological Determinism
Technological determinism represents a belief that tech nological forces determine social and cultural changes.
The following discussion of technological determinism and history is informed by Smith and Marx (1994) . The causal role of technology has been widely accepted in Western culture and the role of technology as an agent of change is common in the popular view of modern history where it is usually featured in simple, plausible narratives comparing an aspect of society before and after a technological innovation and inferring causation to the sudden appearance of the technical innovation. For example, Smith and Marx (1994) write ... the printing press is depicted as a virtual cause of the Ref ormation. Before it was invented, few people . . . owned cop ies of the bible; after Gutenberg, however, many individual communicants were able to gain direct, personal access to the word of God, on which the Reformation thrived. (Smith and Marx 1994, pp. x-xi) The emphasis of these stories is always on the new ma chine and the changes it causes, not on the forces that led to the invention of this innovation. This determin istic view of technology is a common theme in the pop ular discourse on such diverse technologies as the au tomobile (which created suburbia), the birth control pill (which created the sexual revolution), and the com puter (which is restructuring the economy and the work place). This technologically deterministic view, here called the popular version of workplace organization, will be described below as it applies to industrialization, and, later in the paper, as it applies to the post-industrial organization of work. For each of these eras, we will present evidence that the popular version is inadequate and argue that social, political, economic, and cultural forces powerfully shape both technological changes and the organization of work.
3. Historical Patterns of Organizing the Workplace
The Popular Version of Industrialization
The popular version of industrialization commonly ac cepted among laypersons has it that, over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there has been an evolution in the technological and social organiza tion of the workplace from the simple artisanal shop toward large, centralized, bureaucratic places of pro duction structured along the lines of the factory system.
The very term, "industrialization" is a contentious one, for it can mean many things, but for our purposes, in dustrialization was the process that resulted in the mechanization of manufacturing and the concentration of labor. It has been argued that this process of indus trialization was driven by advances in technology and mechanization (Hamerow 1983 , Jones 1987 , 1992 , Landes 1969 , Sussman 1973 .
The extensive historical literature on the phenomenon of industrialization has branched in a number of ways, including debates concerning changes in the methods of production and the impact of those on the economy and society; the organization of the workplace; the na ture and manner of management; the impact of indus trialization on workers, both male and, more recently, female; its impact on management; the relationship be tween industrialization and/or mechanization and la bor unrest and organization; and the impact of technol ogy on the workplace, economy and society. There is much that those interested in understanding the changes in the workplace today could learn from this sizeable body of work, if only to avoid the same pitfalls, as well as to help frame the questions posed of the late twentieth-century workplace.
The study of industrialization began as a study of the Industrial Revolution, a phrase first coined by Arnold Toynbee in 1884. It was considered, first and foremost, a technological revolution, the application of mechani cal power to manufacturing, which revolutionized not only the process of production, but also society and the economy as a consequence. It, in many ways, set the world on the path to modernity, and it began in Great Britain, which became the standard by which other nations' Industrial Revolutions were measured. This school of thought was masterfully expressed in David Landes' seminal work, Unbound Prometheus (1969) . In it, he defined the Industrial Revolution as an inter-related succession of technological changes, with material ad vances in three areas: the substitution of mechanical de vices for human skills; the use of inanimate power, es pecially steam, instead of human and animal strength; and a marked improvement in the obtaining and work ing of raw materials, especially in the metallurgical and chemical industries. With these changes came a new form of industrial organization, the factory system, fol lowed by the creation of the middle and working classes and, eventually, the consumer culture and market econ omy of today. In the words of a nineteenth-century Scot tish chemist and economist, Andrew Ure, (t)he term 'Factory', in technology, designates the combined operation of many orders of work-people, adult and young, in tending with assiduous skill a system that is, to substitute me chanical science for hand skill, and the partition of a process into its essential constituents, for the division or graduation of labor among artisans. On the handicraft plan, labor more or less skilled, was usually the most expensive element of pro duction . . . but on the automatic plan, skilled labor gets pro gressively superseded, and will, eventually, be replaced by mere overlookers of machines, (as quoted in Hamerow 1983, pg. 3-4) The factory system, then, was the predecessor to what Henry Ford introduced in the late nineteenth-century in the United States, continuous flow production. Essen tially, it was the mechanization of production that had previously been done by hand. The efficiencies, econo mies of scale and scope, and improved control over pro duction that resulted from this new form of organiza tion meant that the traditional artisanal or handicraft form of production was unable to compete. A classic example of this process, and of the Industrial Revolu tion, is the textile mills of Britain. With the advent of steam power, textile manufacturers radically rethought the way in which the manufacture of cloth happened.
They built large textile mills, with huge looms and other machinery, all powered by steam, in which they would employ hundreds, eventually thousands, of laborers.
The locations of these mills were determined first and foremost by the availability of either running water or coal, the fuels necessary for the generation of steam power. For the employers, the new form of workplace organization created tremendous opportunities for reaping profits hitherto inconceivable. As a result, the traditional form of production was gradually displaced by the factory system of production, and, by the twen tieth century, supplanted.
Statistical analysis indicated that, beginning in 1780, there was noticeable improvement in British national production levels, which the statisticians attributed to the advent of mechanization. Thus, boiled down to its essence, this school of thought argued that the Indus trial Revolution was technology-driven; unidirectional (from artisanal to factory production); and was a rev olutionary event, with a distinct "take-off point." Fur thermore, Great Britain, being the first to industrialize, was the model which all others sought to imitate, with greater and lesser degrees of success.
Thus, the early historical view of industrialization was that, because of mechanization, over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there was an evolution in the technological and social organization of the workplace from the simple artisanal workshop toward large, centralized, bureaucratic places of pro duction providing a division of labor and structured along the lines of the mass-production factory system. Late in the industrialization process, organizations be gan to integrate vertically by acquiring their competi tors and suppliers and by performing their own distri bution (Perrow 1986) , thus further increasing their size.
They also began aggressively marketing their products and developed their own sales forces and research and development functions, which increased both their size and the degree of differentiation in their structure as departments became more specialized in their functions (Blau 1970 , Blau and Schoenherr 1971 , Chandler 1976 , Child 1973 . Necessarily, there was a dramatic rise in the number of supervisors and managers, often attrib uted to the application of Scientific Management and the division of labor along skill lines which involved the deskilling of production workers and the use of skilled supervisors and managers to plan and control the work (Edwards 1979, Goodman and Honeyman 1988) . Management's control of production and the growth of nonproduction functions within the large firm (e.g., marketing, sales, distribution, personnel, re search and development, etc.) meant that nonproduc tion white collar employment expanded considerably throughout the industrialization process, beginning in the late nineteenth century and continuing into the twentieth (Edwards 1979) . These new, large, bureau cratic firms generally relied on centralized management through a hierarchy for coordination of tasks and exten sive use of large, centralized workplaces. Though man ufacturing was the first to adopt the centralized, indus trial form, companies providing services were also gen erally organized along these lines.
In summary, the popular version of industrialization argues that there is a steady evolution in the structure of the workplace from that of the simple artisanal shop to the modern factory floor, from small firms to large, from simple to ponderous bureaucracies, structured along the lines of the factory system. It assumes that these organizational changes are the result of techno logical innovations, and that the new technology re quired these changes. There is also a sense, in this myth, of the inevitability of progress through industrialization and through factory production, as well as a dismissal of craft or artisanal production as inferior, inefficient, and pre-industrial, a hopeless throwback to a bygone era (Edwards 1979, Piore and Sabel 1984) . At first glance, this seemed self-evident. Prior to the late eigh teenth century, when the industrial revolution began, the European economy was overwhelmingly agrarian in nature with only a small segment of the workforce employed in manufacturing. Mass production and as sembly of interchangeable parts as we know it today did not exist. Manufacturing was largely custom and handicraft in nature, done by hand, by skilled artisans, rural and urban, using simple tools, working in small shops, either alone or with a few journeymen and ap prentices training with them.
Challenges to the Popular Version
This interpretation has since been challenged on a num ber of fronts, including arguments that the British model was not the best, evidence that forces other than technology were crucial, and the realization that mech anization was not necessary or sufficient to cause the observed changes in the production process. Each of these challenges will now be discussed in detail. First, it is now generally accepted by historians that British industrialization was not the only route to industriali zation, nor was it a standard against which all others should be measured. Much work has been done inves tigating the different ways nations have industrialized; these nations emerged with very differently structured, but equally healthy and vibrant, economies as a result.
Nations industrialized differently, not because they ap plied the British model more or less successfully, but because key factors specific to each nation shaped the industrialization process, making each path a unique one, specific to each country. These factors, the second challenge to the technological determinism of the pop ular view of industrialization, were the environment or context in which the nature of production was chang ing. They included a wide range of social, political, le gal, economic, and cultural forces which either encour aged or constrained change in the workplace. A brief comparison of British and French industrialization may serve to demonstrate the nature of these forces.
Great Britain was the first nation to industrialize due to a favorable confluence of circumstances encouraging mass-production and the development of a mass market (Kemp 1985) . In Britain, the structure of feudal agrarian relations had broken down much earlier than on the continent, and in the process, a class of landless wage earners was created who were thrust into the cash econ omy by dint of circumstance. A large portion of the pop ulation depended for its material means of existence upon the production and sale of commodities or upon the sale of its labor power. As the standard of living slowly rose over the course of the nineteenth century, these workers became an important market for cheap, mass-produced goods such as cotton textiles. There was also a new emphasis on individual acquisition and on the rights of property. Wealth, not tradition, became the main determinant of social position, and the nature of acceptable wealth changed dramatically, from a landed wealth to include one more fluid, trade-based, and commerce-based. The guild system had disappeared as well, making it easier to pursue innovation, and remov ing an important barrier to the production of poorer quality, but much less expensive, mass-produced goods. Further, the legal environs facilitated the efforts to engage in mass production and an extensive credit net work existed to provide the necessary capital. In addition, the topography of Britain was advantageous, for it had allowed the establishment of a dense transportation and communications infrastructure in the country, which fa cilitated the movement of goods. Thus, British capitalist entrepreneurs operated in a hospitable environment, where their wealth was deemed socially acceptable.
France developed in a very different manner. It had many of the prerequisites considered necessary for in dustrialization to flourish, including wealth, a growing population, and a flourishing overseas trade. But certain factors pushed French industrial development along a path different from that of Britain. The wealth in France was concentrated in the hands of a very few. The peas antry, who made up over half of the total population throughout the nineteenth century, subsisted on small plots of land and functioned largely outside the cash economy. Any demand for manufactured goods, there fore, came from groups of nobles, as well as wealthy commoners and a few rich peasants, all of whom com prised only a small portion of the population. The re mainder of the population primarily consisted of urban servants, artisans, tradespeople, laborers, and vagrants. They led a hand-to-mouth existence mostly within the cash economy (though bartering was common) and so did not have the economic means required to purchase many manufactured goods. A strong guild system en forced quality standards, preventing mass production of "substandard" goods. Such a marketplace was not conducive to the introduction of mass production. The result was an economy specializing in the production of a variety of high-quality goods in small shops using easily reconfigured, labor-intensive (as opposed to cap ital-intensive), production processes (Sabel and Zeitlin 1985) . Also, investment capital was less available for such a shift, as most of the country's wealth was held in the form of land, and land-owners were loathe to invest in commerce. Finally, the size of France and the lack of internal waterways on the scale of Britain's made the creation of national markets difficult. Once the transportation infrastructure was in place, in which rail ways played a key role, development did proceed apace (Kemp 1985) . Slowly, then, mass production began to develop alongside artisanal variants of production. Yet agriculture continued to dominate the French economy well into the twentieth century. Indeed, the French in dustrial sector did not embrace mass production whole heartedly until after World War II, and then only with the assiduous encouragement and assistance of the state, which led the way with the nationalization of in dustrial firms such as Renault Motorworks, as well as utilities and major banks.
So a variety of factors shaped industrialization in these two countries, and ensured that each would in dustrialize differently. The presence of a large, landless, wage-earning population facilitated a shift to mass pro duction in Britain, and its absence in France acted as a brake, because such a population was needed to supply both a labor force and a mass market for mass-produced goods. The distribution and nature of wealth in each country also shaped the industrialization process. In Britain, much more wealth was available for investment purposes, both because it was not sunk into land and because those with capital were willing to invest in in dustrialization. The legal environment and the trans portation infrastructure also facilitated this kind of ven ture and investment. The opposite was the case in
France. Finally, in Britain, one's social status was not as closely tied to landholding as it was in France. Unlike in France, trade and commerce were considered respect able endeavors in Britain, and success was well re ceived. This list of factors shaping the development of the two nations' economies is hardly comprehensive.
Each of these points is the subject of extensive study and exhaustive debate, however, the overall point is clear. Though the technologies available were the same, the British and French experiences were very different, and they were different because of the confluence of a va riety of social, political, economic, and cultural factors.
The third challenge to technological determinism has been the realization that mechanization did not always result in changes to the production process, nor were all changes to the production process the result of mech anization. In his seminal article on mid-Victorian En gland, Raphael Samuel (1977) convincingly demon strates that, while mechanical power was extensively applied, it by no means reduced workers to the status of mere hands, nor did it replace human labor. Often, he argues, machinery's role in the production process was ancillary, not primary. In his article, he explores a vast array of different industries, ranging from coal mining, to agriculture, food processing, baking, build ing, railway construction, glass and pottery industries, leather and wood trades, metallurgy, and ironmonger ing-all of which, while harnessing steam power where practicable, remained, by and large, labor-intensive and often the terrain of a skilled labor force. Ironically, the introduction of machinery often created a demand for new skills on the part of the labor force, as the machin ery had to be managed, run, and maintained (Piore and Sabel 1984) . Samuel suggests, then, that the organiza tion of work was not greatly altered with the advent of mechanical power and machinery, but instead, mechan ical power and machinery were adapted to the work place.
The converse has also proven true in some areasorganizational changes to the production process have occurred without the impetus of mechanization, and even well before the advent of mechanization. Recent research into proto-industrialization in Europe, how ever controversial the subject may be, has greatly ex panded our understanding in this area (Berg et al. 1983 , Houston and Snell 1984 , Mendels 1972 , Mendels and Deyon 1982 , Mills 1982 . Much of its focus has been on the putting-out system of industrial organization.
Merchant-entrepreneurs purchased raw materials to sell to middlemen called factors. The factors, in turn, hired workers to transform the raw materials into a fin ished product and then sold the transformed product back to the merchantentrepreneur. The workers were paid by the factor on a piece rate from the proceeds (Goodman and Honeyman 1988) . Putting-out typically (but not exclusively) occurred in those rural areas where there was a large landless or land-poor rural pop ulation. Those agricultural workers who were unable to earn adequate wages in agriculture (and this was the vast majority of them, due to several reasons including poor wages and the seasonal nature of employment) were the ones available for supplementary employ ment by the merchant-entrepreneur. Rural industry became an important form of supplementary employ ment for large segments of rural populations. But proto industrialization was more than just rural manufacture.
It was nascent industrialization, with a complex and rigid division of labor, geared to the international, not local, market and developed in symbiosis with com mercial agriculture, or so it was argued. Whether one agrees with the notion of proto-industrialization or not, the literature has brought to light not only the putting out system, but premechanization innovations in sub contracting, the division of labor, international distri bution, cooperative and shared ventures, marketing techniques, credit arrangements, and product innova tion. The presence of these innovations, as seen during proto-industrialization, thus defies the assumption that such innovation only came with the advent of mass production processes and the concomitant changes to the structure of management, markets, and marketing (Berg 1993 (Berg ,1994 .
What also has become apparent as historians have explored the process of industrialization, is that the ste reotypical large mass-production factory was and is far from the only method of organizing work. Small craft based firms have continued to exist and thrive beside large conglomerates well into the twentieth century (Edwards 1979) . Initially, Piore (1980) and others de veloped the theory of industrial dualism in order to ex plain the persistence of small firms. This theory holds that a mass-production economy required the presence of a healthy custom or craft-based sector to manufacture the specialized machinery required for mass production of interchangeable parts, and to service markets with high rates of fluctuation or low levels of demand. While mass production meant the manufacture of general goods through the use of specialized resources and cap ital equipment, at the same time, that created a need for specialized machines and finely divided and trained la bor to build them. Ironically, the special-purpose ma chinery required could not be mass-produced, so on the very fringe of every industry there were small firms to service the large. Yet, the assumption that the backbone of the economy was mass production and the factory system remained intact. Several historians (Sabel and Zeitlin 1985, Scranton 1991 practiced an alternate form of industrial organization called "flexible specialization." It was a craft alternative to mass production that rejected a strategy of manufac turing large numbers of any one product and, instead, focused on creating the capacity to manufacture diverse products to fill fluctuating demand.
Those firms that practiced flexible specialization shared common characteristics. They produced a wide range of goods to suit the needs of highly differentiated regional markets at home and abroad, and they could alter the mix of goods to match changing markets and tastes and to take advantage of new opportunities as they arose. This required the flexible use of an increas ingly more productive and widely applicable technol ogy and an environment that encouraged permanent innovation. The technology had to be flexible in order to allow quick and inexpensive shifts from one product to another within a family of products, and permit the constant expansion of the range of materials worked and operations performed, facilitating the shift from one family of products to another. These firms banded together in various forms of cooperatives, dependent upon the particular characteristics of the regional soci ety, economy, and political structure. The purpose of doing so was threefold: to stabilize the region's industry to the benefit of all; to prevent disastrous competition and, instead, promote judicious cooperation; and to fa cilitate the promotion of innovation, which would have been much more difficult, if impossible, for a small shop to do on its own (Best 1990 , Piore and Sabel 1984 , Scran ton 1991 .
Others, notably Maxine Berg (1994) , have objected to the stark distinction drawn between small and large firms, and concomitantly, the traditional and modern industrial sectors, even by Piore and Sabel (1984) . Her concern (similar to that of Williams et al. 1987 ) is that many manufacturers borrowed techniques from both of these sectors, thus really straddling the divide and ren dering it methodologically problematic. Whichever side of the debate one chooses, it is apparent that the nine teenth and twentieth centuries witnessed anything but a unidirectional shift from artisanal to factory produc tion due to advances in technology.
A further implication of proto-industrialization was that the Industrial Revolution was not a revolution at all. If industrialization had its roots in the cottage man ufacturing of the seventeenth century, and if the advent of mechanization and, especially, steam power was not responsible for its "kick-start," then the changes to the structure of the European economy had been a long time in happening and the revolution was not so revo lutionary or abrupt after all. This debate was heightened by Crafts (1976) and Wrigley and Schofield (1981) , among others, when they reworked the statistical infor mation used by Deane and Cole (1962) to show that there was a marked "kink in the curve" of national pro duction after mechanization. Their conclusion was that overall growth was slower than had been thought and that the story was one of continuity and stability, not dramatic upheaval (Berg 1994 , Landes 1991 . So the de bate continues, between those who argue that the num bers deny that anything revolutionary occurred and those, like Landes (1991) and Berg (1994) , who argue that, whether the numbers reveal it or not, "there was a break (which) was indeed revolutionary in its import. It consisted in new ways of doing things, supported by new ways of thinking about the problems and tasks of production." (Landes 1991, p. 13) One conclusion that may be drawn from this brief survey of a complex body of literature is this: If we wish to understand the changes in the workplace of yester year or the changes in today's workplace, we must con sider not only the impact of technology. We must also consider the roots and enablers of the changes, those social, political, legal, economic, and cultural factors that help to explain why things have changed as they have in the past, and are changing in the manner in which they are changing today.
The Emerging Popular Interpretation of Post industrialization
Because the causal role of technology has been widely accepted in Western popular culture (Smith and Marx 1994) , it is not surprising to find that computers are of ten identified as powerful agents of social and economic change ushering in the new "post-industrial" form of organization (Bell 1989 , Bolter 1984 (Bolter 1984, p. 10) .
Though the causal agents and mechanisms of change are still debatable, overall, the description of the new post-industrial organization of work presented in the media is fairly consistent. While the early and mid twentieth century appeared to be marked by consider able growth in the size of firms and by the gradual in tegration and aggregation of business functions, the late twentieth century seems marked by a trend in the op posite direction. Recently, the large proportion of non production (mostly white-collar, middle management, or professional) workers have come to be seen as a drain on competitiveness in both Western and Japanese com panies (The Economist 1995d , Thurow 1986 , Tomasko 1987 . (However, see The Economist 1995a for the op posing view arguing that companies that have dis missed many middle managers are now coming to re alize the value of the knowledge and perspective they have lost.) Many top management teams have been try ing to create organizations that are leaner, meaner, and more flexible in order to meet the challenges of rapidly changing technologies and the vagaries of an appar ently more dynamic economy (Best 1990, Labib and Ap pelbaum 1994) .
Thus, in many firms, the traditional organizational structure is now changing in ways that have purport edly been caused by new advances in computerized in formation systems and new information technologies, Many who study Information Technology believe that improved telecommunications has reduced the ad vantages of intrafirm management and performance of professional staff activities (e.g. MIS, personnel, mar keting, and research) and reduced the need for middle managers as conduits for information (Gurbaxani and Whang 1991 , Malone and Rockart 1991 , Miles and Snow 1986 , Reddy 1990 , Rockart and Short 1989 . The advan tages of the large firm, which were seen as rooted in the low costs of intrafirm communications, are seen as eroded by the rapid decline in the costs of interfirm communication (Malone et al. 1987 , Miles and Snow 1986 , Mills 1991 , Nilles et al. 1976 , Olson 1983 , Reddy 1990 ). According to this school of thought, because of advances in information technology and the move to an information-based economy, it is no longer necessary to perform all aspects of the production, commerce, and distribution processes in-house or to locate them all in one geographic place (Brynjolfsson et al. 1994 ). Malone and Rockart (1991) explicitly reported that, based on their research on the effect of IT on the cost of infor mation, "information technology should lead to an overall shift from internal decisions within firms to the use of markets to coordinate economic activity" (p. 131) .
Thus, firms in some industries have come to rely on external sources for a larger number of components and for administrative and support services, which often re sults in the disaggregation or "spinning off" of portions of these activities to other organizations. Some of the production functions and many of the staff functions performed by professionals in large organizations are now being contracted out to smaller, more specialized firms. Increasingly, organizations are dispersing geo graphically and disaggregating; entire administrative functions and production of components that were pre viously performed in-house are now contracted out or performed by temporary workers on a contract basis. (Best 1990 , Malone and Rockart 1991 , Miles and Snow 1986 , Piore and Sabel 1984 , Reddy 1990 , Rockart and Short 1989 .
Concurrently, much of the work control function for merly performed by supervisors and middle managers is now seen as superfluous-increasingly, these activi ties are seen as embedded in the ubiquitous computer hardware and software. As Jackson and Humble (1994) write, " (Cameron et al. 1991 , Freeman and Cameron 1993 , Labib and Appelbaum 1994 and has become an accepted, almost routine way of man aging; many believe it will remain common during the foreseeable future.
Simultaneously, growth in the geographic dispersion of work, in self-employment, in the business services sector generally, and in the temporary worker industry in particular, has been very rapid (Carey and Hazel baker 1986 , Howe 1986 , Pearson 1986 ). It is difficult to get accurate data on the size of the "contingent" work force, including part-timers, freelancers, subcontractors, independent professionals, and temporary workers.
However, in his widely read book, The Age of Unreason, Charles Handy (1989) stated that "less than half of the work force in the industrial world will be in 'proper' full-time jobs in organizations by the beginning of the twenty-first century" (p. 31) and one recent estimate is that the contingent workforce has already exceeded 28 percent of U.S. workers (Greenbaum 1994) . Many of the workers who have been fired have started their own small businesses or consulting firms competing for con tracts in the market place. Others have filled a series of temporary positions either through temporary agencies or independently. Concurrently, we have seen a rise in home-based work and telecommuting through the use of information technology. Martino and Wirth (1990) explicitly attribute this growth to the lower cost of in formation technology. They state that "technological in novation is a leading factor in the development of tele work" (p. 534). Future growth of employment in large organizations may well be nonexistent. A large and growing sector of the workforce that would previously have entered a stable long-term employment relation ship with a large, hierarchical organization will, instead, likely engage in a series of temporary contractual ar rangements to provide a service or product for a limited period of time, much as workers did before the indus trial revolution.
It appears, then, that we may be in the midst of yet another industrial revolution or at another "industrial divide" (Piore and Sabel 1984) , precipitated by the use of the computer and the shift to a knowledge-based economy and with profound changes being made to the workplace and concomitant changes to society as a whole. IT seems to be restructuring the economy into a more flexible, dynamic, network of organizations with many smaller, leaner, firms narrowly focused on their areas of competence and engaged in temporary part nerships with other firms in order to produce a product or provide a service in response to fluctuating demand. Interestingly, this scenario shares many characteristics of the flexible specialization form of industrial organi zation found in some manufacturing districts of the nineteenth century and currently seen in such areas as the textile district of Prato and the computer industry in the Silicon Valley of California (Sabel and Zeitlin 1985, Scranton 1991) . Some authors (Best 1990, Piore and Sabel 1984) have argued that IT has forced more firms to adopt this form of industrial organization, and so the social, cultural, and economic conditions that arose to support these districts in the past must be es tablished today to support flexible specialization, pre vent disastrous competition, and promote innovation.
Challenges to this Popular Version
While the changes currently being made in the organi zation of work are profound, management researchers are not generally investigating their causes in a com Information Systems Research Vol. 7, No. 1, March 1996 prehensive and systematic fashion. Consequently, an oversimplified and often misleading story is being told about the causes of the shift to the post-industrial form of organization. This new myth is similar to the indus trialization myth in that it emphasizes technology as the causal agent and considers the flexible, dynamic form of organization a natural and ever-improving evolution in the organization of work, one that mirrors the evo lution of technology and is primarily caused by it. How ever, as we have shown in our historical analysis, this flexible form is not new. It was historically common in many industries, in the forms of flexible specialization and the putting-out system of manufacturing, and has persisted into contemporary times in some (Best 1990 , Piore and Sabel 1984 , Sabel and Zeitlin 1985 , Williams et al. 1987 .
Similarly, the myth of technological determinism has been exploded for industrialization (Smith and Marx 1994) , and there is no proof of its truth for post industrialization. Though advances in IT may be affect ing the organization of work, other factors may be equally important in explaining the shift away from the typical industrial form (Best 1990 , Scranton 1991 . With out careful and detailed research, causation is impossi ble to determine. Several theories have been suggested to explain the changes observed, but none has ade quately addressed the questions: Why have these par ticular changes occurred? Why have these changes oc curred now and not earlier or later? Without theories that are sufficiently well developed to address these is sues, testable hypotheses cannot be derived, and so the theories are no more useful than tautologies. Several of the causal agents widely accepted in the literature are described below with a critique of the evidence for their relationship to IT and to the organization of work. These agents include: flexibility in the location of work, dis integration of the mass market, compression of time and space, the increasing pace of change, and increasing lev els of risk, increased flexibility, and global competition.
It has been suggested that the availability of IT has now rendered the location of work more flexible and this has caused the decentralization of work (using sat ellite offices or working from home) (Martino and Wirth 1990) . The popular view of the industrial revolution posits that the location of work became centralized pri marily because the new technology required access to a centralized power source (e.g. water power, the steam engine). However, electricity has provided an oppor tunity for decentralization of the power supply and, therefore, decentralization of the place of work since the early 1890s, but has not appreciably affected the geo graphic dispersion of workers. No explanation is pro vided in the literature for why IT has countered this long-standing tradition of a centralized workplace, but electricity did not. Therefore, there is no consistent ev idence of the technology as the main driving force for decentralization. There may be other factors associated with IT that were not associated with electricity (such as the ability to closely supervise workers), but these must be illuminated by theory before they can be tested.
Similarly, another reason cited for the change to a flexible work organization is the decline of the mass market and the demand for customized products (Piore and Sabel 1984) . One of the critical limits to mass pro duction is the development of a mass market for con sumption of standard products (Sabel and Zeitlin 1985, Scranton 1991) . However, during industrialization, the mass market was specifically created by mass produc ers, often through advertising and marketing, (Sabel and Zeitlin 1985, Sussman 1973) . The literature on IT and the organization of work has not shown that the mass market is substantially disintegrating, explained why it is breaking down now, or explained why pro ducers cannot develop additional mass markets (partic ularly with the increasingly global marketplace) in East ern Europe, Africa, and the Far East (Williams et al. 1987) . Without evidence of a disintegration of the mar ket and an explanation of why manufacturers were once able to create a mass market to support industrializa tion, but are no longer able to do so, this claim becomes a tautology, not a testable theory.
Another reason cited for the change to a flexible work organization is the capability of IT to compress time and space. However, IT has been doing so for the last 150 years, in the form of the telegraph and the telephone (Yates and Benjamin 1991) . So why are we seeing the change in organizational forms now? Perhaps we have crossed a crucial cost threshold. Only carefully per formed studies will be able to answer this question and illuminate where this threshold lies.
The increased pace of change and the increased level of risk experienced by owners of businesses Information Systems Research Vol. 7, No. 1, March 1996 have also been cited as causes of the change to a flex ible work organization. However, there has been no objective, quantitative, empirical, economic evidence presented of changes in environmental turbulence over the last 30 years (the period of post-industrialization) (Holbein 1993) . Further, there is considerable evi dence that perceptions of environmental dynamism (upon which changes in organizational structure are based) are not generally related to objective measures of turbulence (Boyd et al. 1993 , Holbein 1993 , Milliken 1987 . Finally, historical analysis shows other eco nomically risky periods (including wars, depressions, and massive unemployment) that did not result in an appreciable increase in the flexible organization form.
Two additional reasons cited for the change are that the technology has become more flexible (i.e., computer-aided design, computer-integrated manufac turing) and multifunctional, and that the marketplace has become increasingly global; therefore, the level of competition has increased (Piore and Sabel 1984) . How ever, Williams and his colleagues (1987) strongly ar gued that potential flexibility is quite different from flexibility in use and that most "flexible manufacturing systems" in the United States are not used very flexibly and that, indeed, most advanced computer capabilities are not used. Further, they argue that computerized manufacturing technology (with its high capital ex pense and development costs) does not fundamentally change the scale economies of manufacturers and so does not generally disadvantage mass producers rela tive to batch producers. Firms selling to a larger market would still be at an advantage because they could spread their fixed costs over more customers (The Econ omist 1995c , Williams et al. 1987 . Further, historical ev idence has not been presented showing a sharp increase in the level of competition experienced by firms and industries in which changes in the organization of work are occurring. There is, however, some evidence that globalization provides some additional distinct advan tages to multinational firms (i.e. global reach, decreas ing risk, knowledge management, economies of time) over smaller firms (The Economist 1995c) by opening even larger mass markets. Globalization has been as sociated with increases in average firm size when other variables were controlled (Brynjolfsson et al. 1994 ).
Interestingly, these two characteristics (flexibility and globalization) were shared with the artisanal and putting-out manufacturing systems of proto industrialization and with flexible specialization. The simple hand tools and machine tools used in such sys tems were more multifunctional, requiring more skill on the part of the worker. In the period of proto industrialization, strong trading ties existed among the Western European nations and among the colonial powers and their colonies, and many of the manufac tured goods (particularly those involved in manufac turing cloth) were traded throughout Europe, Asia, and the Americas. Perhaps the change in the organization of work is due more to the potential flexibility of the tech nology, to the renewed globalization of trade, or to the combination of flexibility and globalization, than to the presence of IT, per se. However, so far, there has been insufficient research into this area to draw firm conclu sions. Furthermore, what evidence has accumulated casts doubt on the adequacy of these explanations alone (Brynjolfsson et al. 1994 , Williams et al. 1987 ). Future research is needed to understand the roles of flexibility and globalization in the organization of work. In sum mary, there is insufficient evidence to support the con clusion that IT has caused widespread changes in the organization of work due to its flexibility, compression of time and space, the disintegration of the mass market, or increasing levels of risk or global competition.
Of course, not all researchers investigating the chang ing nature of work have taken a hardline technologi cally determinist position; some have taken more social constructionist positions (Best 1990 , Lloyd-Jones and Lewis 1994 , Piore and Sabel 1984 , Scranton 1991 . Social constructionists believe that social and cultural forces give different social meanings to artifacts, and so strongly affect technological changes. These groups are seen to influence the selection of those designs that solve the problems of powerful interest groups and that fill their needs (Hughes 1994 ). An in-depth treatment of the various arguments surrounding technological deter minism versus social construction is not possible here (interested readers may want to investigate Smith and Marx 1994) . However, the social construction literature Each of these will be briefly discussed below.
One possibility is that the societal norms about how efficient and productive organizations should be struc tured have changed over the last 30 years. In explaining the recent interest in entrepreneurship, Bruce Kirchhoff (1994) suggests that after exposure to the Depression and World War II, American society came to respect and admire large corporations and the public sector be cause of their demonstrated ability to meet these na tional challenges, and to see them as the preferred source of employment, as the primary source of wealth creation, and as the best means of wealth distribution.
However, this respect and admiration has been greatly eroded recently and replaced by a view of large corpo rations and government as wasteful and inefficient.
According to the theory of institutionalization, orga nizations whose structures respond to the pressures of institutions in their environment (regardless of their op erational advantages) and, therefore, reflect the norms of society, gain legitimacy and the resources they re quire for survival. Thus, they are more likely to prosper (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, King et al. 1994, Meyer and  Rowan 1977). Consequently, organizations within an institutional environment will become similar to each other. Institutionalization is most likely to be seen in situations where criteria for organizational performance and the best means to achieve these are unclear, com panies are highly regulated, and interorganizational re lationships are common (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
There is some evidence of the propagation of the factory form of manufacturing throughout the economy due to institutionalization, particularly just after World War I. Some national governments (powerful institutions) ac tively encouraged the conversion to mass production after World War II (Sabel and Zeitlin 1985) as a form of "modernization." It is equally likely that organizations of today would be strongly influenced by their culture's norms regarding appropriate structure and levels of ef ficiency.
Previous researchers illuminated the impact of mac roeconomic forces on the organization of work in much more detail than can be covered here. However, we will briefly touch on a couple of fundamental issues. One is the use or abandonment of the gold standard with the shift to floating exchange rates (Lloyd-Jones and Lewis 1994, Piore and Sabel 1984) , and the relative strength and volatility of various currencies as a determinant of the cost and location of production (The Economist 1995d). Another is the rate of inflation, the pursuit of deflationary or inflationary monetary policies, stability and levels of interest rates, the availability of capital for investment and expansion, and the ability to move cap ital internationally (Best 1990 , The Economist 1995b , Scranton 1991 . All of these forces affect a firm's strategy and tactics as it pursues profits and are likely to influ ence choices about the organization of work through their effects on the costs and availability of capital, la bor, and other resources. Many of these effects are sim ple and immediate, but some may require a specific con figuration of influences or may take years to develop.
A related issue is the amount and type of legal reg ulations and their enforcement. These can include tariff protection and agreements, free-trade treaties, antitrust laws, product and owner liability laws, international commerce and contract law, labor laws, and taxation rates. Japan's relatively closed markets are often cited as a major cause of Japanese companies' economic suc cess (Best 1990) . In rejecting the computer as a cause of the current economic restructuring, public policy pro fessor David Howell (1995) suggests that legal restric tions may be a more powerful influence. He explains that in the United States, institutions designed to protect low-skilled workers from wage competition have re cently been dismantled, labor-law monitoring has de clined, and the real value of the minimum wage has diminished. This change in the legal environment, not IT, has led United States firms to attempt to gain com petitive advantage by reducing labor costs through in creased use of temporary, part-time, contract, and off site workers in the United States and abroad. Indeed, lax standards for labor and environmental protection and reduced owner liability are often cited as powerful forces drawing many organizations to move their facil ities out of the industrialized countries altogether.
Other issues likely to affect the changing organi zation of work include demographics and labor rela tions. Some researchers see computer technology and the new organization of work as an opportunity to reduce the power of labor by replacing it with capital, or fragmenting workers into various categories with divergent interests (i.e., full-time versus part-time, contractual versus permanent, home-based versus office-based) (Greenbaum 1994) . Increases in the un employment rate certainly improve the bargaining position of employers relative to employees. The cur rent shift in the United States and Canada to an older population may result in a demand for more services and fewer new durable goods, thus shrinking the mass market for these goods.
In summary, IT has been widely accepted as the driv ing force behind the changing organization of work, which, in turn, has been credited with increasing effi ciency, effectiveness, and quality while providing faster time to market, lower overhead costs, increased custom ization, and, therefore, improved competitiveness (see, for example, Magnet 1992, Malone and . However, empirical evidence of these benefits has been inconsistent at best (Business Week 1993, The Econo mist 1995a) and often nonexistent (Cascio 1993, Labib and Appelbaum 1994) . A flattened hierarchy, disaggre gation of functions, decentralization of work location, and increased use of partnerships are expected to lead to a renewed reliance on temporary subcontracting and self-employment. Interestingly, this "new" organiza tional structure of the workplace is strikingly similar to past models, such as proto-industrialization and flexible specialization, (Mendels 1972 , Mendels and Deyon 1982 , Sabel and Zeitlin 1985 , which arose without the presence of information technology. The current litera ture on causes of these recent changes in the organiza tion of work has proven inadequate to account for the shift away from industrialization. To illuminate what is happening to the world of work and to explain why it is happening, we need to concentrate on three areas: (1) producing better, more detailed, descriptive research on the changes occurring; (2) developing clearer, more complete, and less-simplistic theories of the causes of the changes from which testable hypotheses can be de veloped; and (3) performing systematic theory-testing research to illuminate the causes of the organization of work during modern times, recent history, and prein dustrial history.
Conclusions
The similarities between the "new" organizational structure being touted today as industry's salvation and other, older models such as the putting-out system, ar tisanal production, and flexible specialization are strik ing. They also warn us against quickly assuming that the "new" organizational structure is simply the result of recent changes in technology. Instead, we need to consider the possibility of social, economic, political, and cultural causes of this organizational change, while clarifying the role of technology.
It is possible that the similarities between the proto industrial and post-industrial eras are due to common goals. In each case, the central decision-makers sought and seek to reduce their risk, as well as to obtain more flexibility. Such flexibility would, and did, permit a firm to respond more quickly to changing technologies and markets, while minimizing the cost to the firm of adapt ing to those changing technologies. The flexibility also permits a firm to protect itself from the vagaries of an increasingly unstable economy. Another possibility is that the organizational changes, past and present, came as the result of social movements, macro-economics, and forces of institutionalization, rather than technol ogy. Though there is considerable evidence of social and economic influence in determining the trajectory of in dustrialization (Goodman and Honeyman 1988 , Jones 1987 ,1992 , Piore and Sabel 1984 , Sabel and Zeitlin 1985 , Scranton 1991 , little research on post-industrialization has focused on social and economic influences and how they are affecting this transformation of work. It is also likely that institutions are affecting the decisions made by managers to make the changes associated with this "new" form of organization.
It seems that if the challenge is to try to understand the nature of the changes rocking the workplace today, and, secondly, to understand and manage the possible consequences of those changes, the historical literature could be useful in helping us identify the questions that 
